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LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF POLICE:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN INVESTIGATION OF
POLICE HANDLING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mary M. Cheh *

I. INTRODUCTION

Various mechanisms exist to oversee police behavior. These include internal
discipline, civilian review boards, civil lawsuits, and criminal prosecutions. These are
important tools, and commentators and police experts have devoted considerable effort
to refining and critiquing them. ' But another, less examined tool is legislative oversight
and, in particular, the legislative investigation. When the legislature steps in, there is
both power to act-through subpoenas and, ultimately, legislation-and the gravitas of
the people's representatives focusing their attention on police practices.
Legislative investigations are usually associated with Congress, typically in the
form of public hearings. But policing is largely a local and decentralized affair, and
cities and counties have a vital role in exercising oversight of the police. Most local
oversight, to the extent that it is exercised, occurs as part of the budgetary process. A
town council, for example, may question the amount, purpose, or results of certain
expenditures. On occasion, however, when the issue is politically salient and involves
police practices that are neither isolated nor sporadic but department-wide and ongoing, local legislative bodies may choose to inform themselves with their own inquiry.
The legislature may therefore choose to review police policies concerning the use
of surveillance, 2 informants and undercover operatives, 3 the implementation of

. Elycee Zenoff Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. The author served
as Special
Counsel to the D.C. Committee of the Judiciary. Many thanks to G.W. law student V. David Zvenyach who
provided invaluable research assistance and wonderful enthusiasm. All views expressed are the author's own
and are not meant to reflect the views of the District of Columbia.
1. See POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE (William A.

Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (collecting many articles and an extensive bibliography, primarily focused on
issues of brutality); see also ANDREW GOLDSTEIN & COLLEEN LEWIS, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICING:
GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in

the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151 (2003); Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of
Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CR1M. L. 653 (2004) (analyzing the efficacy of traditional approaches of
complaint review as a vehicle for systemic reform).
2. See, e.g., Martha T. Moore, Cities Opening More Video Surveillance Eyes, USA TODAY, July 18,
2005, at 3A:
Civil libertarians complain that although private security video often is seen only after a crime has
occurred, many public video cameras are watched all the time. In Washington, public protest led
to restrictions: Cameras are turned on only during large demonstrations and emergencies, and that
fact is announced at the time.
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community policing, 4 the use of force, 5 eradication of gang activity, 6 and, perhaps
most prominently in the post 9/11 world, counter-terrorism initiatives. 7 All of these
matters involve policy decisions at the department level and not actions taken at the
discretion of individual officers in the field. The aim of legislative oversight is not to
micro-manage police decisions, but to structure those decisions in line with best
practices and to maintain constitutional boundaries. Acting through their elected
representatives, communities can have a say, for example, in whether shoot-to-kill
policies 8 should be liberalized; whether, and under what circumstances, random
searches may be conducted of anyone traveling on a bus or a train; 9 and the extent to
which the police may maintain dossiers on individuals or groups.10
This essay identifies the benefits and limits of local legislative investigations as a
means of police oversight by looking at the 2003 investigation of the Metropolitan
Police Department by the Judiciary Committee of the City Council of the District of
Columbia. I The investigation focused on how the police handled (or mishandled) antiglobalization demonstrations held in Washington, D.C. from 2000-2003, and how that
inquiry led, ultimately, to the drafting of model legislation, "The First Amendment

Id. See also Editorial, Watching the Watchers, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at A20. Congress, unlike state
legislatures, has passed many laws related to surveillance and privacy. See, e.g., Federal Communications
Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III (1968); Electronic
Communication Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414 (1994).
3. Arthur Santana, Ramsey Defends Surveilling Protesters; Chief Says Some Changes Needed as
Council Members Object to Undercover Tactics, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at B5.
4. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 654 (1997) ("Police departments are also at
least theoretically accountable to local legislative bodies, since these bodies perform an oversight function that
some community policing theorists have suggested might be enhanced ... ").
5. See Jeremy Meyer, Police Oversight Plan Revised Aurora Board Would Have Four From Community,
Four From Cops, DENVER POST, July 15, 2005, at B5 (discussing the creation of a "use-of-force" review
board in Denver).
6. See Yvonne Abraham, More Cities Weigh Crackdown on Gangs, Boston Globe, Apr. 21, 2003, at Al.
7. See, e.g., John Caher, State Legislature Approves Tough Anti-Terrorism Laws, NEW YORK L.J., Sept.
18, 2001, at I (reporting the passage of a New York state counter-terrorism measure in the wake of9/1 1).
8. The Capitol Police of Washington, D.C., for example, has a controversial "shoot-to-kill" policy,
which permits officers to shoot suspected suicide bombers. Compare Sari Horwitz, Capitol Police Focused
On Terror; Recent Moves Part of BroaderStrategy, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at B1 ("If the suspect appears
to be carrying explosives and refuses to stop and be searched or to cooperate otherwise, officers are instructed
to shoot the suspect in the head."), with Editorial, Shoot to Kill, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2005, at Al 5:
The key lesson here is that with rigorous training, authorities can learn to identify suicide bombers
with greater accuracy, and to disarm them in most instances without killing. Shooting to the head
may be a necessary last resort, but if through rash actions and poor judgment innocent people end
up as the victims, the main battle has already been lost.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Kareem Fahim, New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at Al. Notably, the use of random searches on subways in New York has not only
caused controversy, it has led to litigation. See Michelle Garcia, New York Police Sued Over Subway
Searches, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2005, at A3;
10. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 181.575 (2003) (Oregon law limiting the amount and type of information
that law enforcement agencies may collect).
11. D.C. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S POLICY AND PRACTICE IN HANDLING DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[hereinafter D.C. REPORT] (2004), available at
http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/patterson/
kathypatterson.org/ pages/prinfo/ MPDReportFina5304.doc (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
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Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004," which became law in 2005.12 The
experience shows that legislatures need not be bystanders to police misbehavior or
excess and that, indeed, the people's representatives may be in the best position to judge
13
the wisdom of police policies and practices and, where appropriate, provide reform.
II. BACKGROUND
As the nation's capital, Washington, D.C. has served as the major United States site
for hundreds of protests, demonstrations, rallies, and marches. 14 Between the years
2000 and 2003, thousands of demonstrators came to the city specifically to protest the
effects of globalization, the inauguration of George W. Bush as President, and the war
in Iraq. 15 Similar protests occurred in cities around the nation. The most notorious
protest occurred in Seattle, Washington during World Trade Organization meetings held
November 29 to December 3, 1999. A more recent violent encounter took place during
Western Hemisphere free trade talks held in Miami, Florida on November 20, 2003.16
The violence arose from clashes with the police when overwhelmingly non-violent
protestors faced official overreaction and police brutality.
In Seattle, a small number of demonstrators blocked streets, set fire to trash cans,
spray painted graffiti, vandalized stores, and caused more than $3 million in damage to
downtown businesses. 17 There were 631 arrests, most of them for obstruction of traffic
and failure to disperse. 18 The cause of this "disastrous week of tear gas, burning
dumpsters, and injured citizens" 19 was a complicated amalgam of poor planning, a
police force of 600 overwhelmed by the task of policing a crowd of 50,000, a small

12. The First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 2296 (Mar. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter FARPSA].
13. Indeed, while courts are often seen as the vehicle for counter-majoritarian protection of individual
rights from the police, the MPD investigation proves that legislatures are uniquely capable of reinforcing
individual liberties through democratic means. For a discussion of the relationship between democracy and
law enforcement, see David A. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1699 (2005) (discussing
theories of democratic pluralism, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy as they apply to
various issues in policing).
14. See generally LucY BARBER, MARCHING ON WASHINGTON (2002) (recounting the history of
marches and demonstrations in Washington, D.C.). Capital cities have historically served as major sites for
symbolic protests, and the response to those protests can reflect the values of the nation generally. Therefore,
the Chinese response to the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing reflected the perception of the oppressive
communist regime. In contrast, the recent Orange Revolution protests in Independence Square in Kiev,
Ukraine, were hailed by the West as a symbol of strength and the triumph of democracy.
15. See, e.g., Petula Dvorak & Michael E. Ruane, Police, Protesters Claim Victory; Scattered Scuffles
and Arrests Punctuate a Largely Peaceful Day, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2000, at Al (IMF protests); Karlyn
Barker & Serge F. Kovaleski, Day is Filled With Drama and Defiance, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at Al
(inauguration protests); Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, 100,000 Rally, March Against War in Iraq, WASH.
POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at AI (anti-war protests).
16. See, e.g., David Postman, Jack Broom & Florangela Davila, Police Haul Hundreds to Jail- National
Guard on Patrol; 1,000 Protestors Enter Restricted Zone, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al (Seattle
protests); Steven Greenhouse, Demonstration Turns Violent at Trade Talks in Miami, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2 1,
2003, at A25 (Miami protests).
17. SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, WTO AFTER ACTION REP. 34,49 (2000), available at http://www.ci.seattle.
wa.us/Police/Publications/WTO/WTOAAR.PDF.
18. Id.at 48.
19. SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, WTO ARC PREPARATIONS AND PLANNING PANEL, FINAL REPORT 3 (2000),

available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/panel2final.pdf.
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number of violent actions by protestors, and broad overreaction by the police and
The Seattle City Council's World Trade Organization
government officials.
Accountability Review Committee found that "[t]he WTO Conference deteriorated into
chaos and violence due to: (1) [p]oor planning and preparation[,] (2) [i]imited
coordination among Mayor Paul Schell, the Seattle Police Department, and the Seattle
Host Organization[,] and (3) [a] pattern of leaders
at every level abdicating their
21
responsibilities throughout the planning process."
In Miami, 2,500 police clad in full riot gear met 8,000-10,000 demonstrators who
were mostly union members and retirees. 22 In response to provocations as mild as one
protestor throwing an orange, police indiscriminately assaulted, pepper-sprayed, and
shot rubber bullets at the otherwise peaceful crowd. 23 In some incidents, there was no
crowd provocation of any kind. The police hit protestors with batons, zapped them with
stun guns, and dispersed them with tear gas. 24 Overall, the police arrested more than
200 people. 2 5 An independent panel created to review the actions of the police
"strenuously condemn[ed] and deplore[d] the unrestrained and disproportionate use of
force observed in Miami"' 26 and expressed "heartfelt apologies to the visitors who came
to [the] city to peaceably
voice their concerns, but who were met with closed fists
27
instead of open arms."
Even in cities that did not experience such dramatic behavior, police and
government officials have deprived anti-globalization, anti-war, and anti-administration
protestors of their rights of free expression by more subtle tactics. 28 In other situations,
protestors have been forced to demonstrate in out-of-sight locations or have been
penned behind barricades to keep them from the objects of their protest. 29 The Secret
Service has, for example, used "security zones" to insulate President Bush from the
sights and sounds of opposition marches and demonstrations. 30 Federal and state police
have used sophisticated and intimidating tactics, such as surveillance, undercover

20. Id. at 4; see also SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE 3
(2000), available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/arcfinal.pdf.
21. Seattle City Council Planning Panel Report, supra note 19, at 4.
22. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 16; John Pacenti, Miami Trade Summit Security Hailed, Reviled,
PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at IA; Robyn E. Blumner, Miami Crowd Control Would Do a Tyrant
Proud,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, at IP.
23. See Blumner, supra note 22.
24. See id.; see also Greenhouse, supra note 16.
25. See Pacenti, supra note 22.
26. INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FTAA DEMONSTRATION COMPLAINTS INQUIRY 1-2 (2004), availableat

http://www.co.miami-dade.fl.us/irp/Library/5-19-04_FTAAExec-sum.pdf.
27. Id. at 1-2.
28. Most recently, police used the tactic of mass arrests during the 2004 Republican National Convention
in New York City, where over a thousand protestors were arrested. In subsequent lawsuits, some of the
protestors have alleged that the arrests were unlawful and baseless, and that protestors were held in unsafe
conditions (according to some reports, those arrested were held in a former bus garage on a riverfront pier),
and that they were detained for excessive periods of time. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Vast Anti-Bush
Rally Greets Republicans in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at Al; Martha T. Moore, Protesters
Challenge NYC Arrests, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2005, at 3A; Diane Cardwell, Lawyers' Group Sues City Over
Arrests of Protesters,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3.
29. See Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection of Special
Places, 8 D.C. L. REV. 53, 57-58 (2004).
30. See id. at 58-60.
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operatives, disinformation, and preemptive arrests, to undermine and frustrate the
ability of protestors to conduct their demonstrations and send their message to the larger
public. 31
Since the tumultuous anti-Vietnam protests of the 1970s, the Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) of Washington, D.C. (and the related police agencies of the area
such as the National Park Police) have gained a reputation for peacefully, efficiently,
and fairly handling mass demonstrations. 32 The MPD proved able to protect the public
and honor the free speech rights of protestors, even hundreds of thousands at a time and
even in the presence of counter demonstrations. But most of these free speech events
were tame, negotiated, stage-managed affairs that, despite their size, were usually
33
controversial only in the debate about how big the crowd was.
The anti-globalization protests were different. 34
They were the kind of
troublesome protests that police seek to dominate lest they get out of control. 35 The
protestors, many of whom were students, sometimes used radical rhetoric. 36 They were
boisterous, confrontational, occasionally disobedient, and hard to negotiate with
37
because they were comprised of many loosely affiliated and decentralized groups.
Some of the groups pre-announced their plans to engage in civil disobedience, such as
blocking traffic or preventing the members of the World Bank or International
Monetary Fund from holding their meetings. 38 And the police, as they had in the past
with anti-Vietnam war marchers, took up battle stations. They inflated crowd estimates
and exaggerated dangers. 39 The police made plans for infiltrating, disrupting, and
preempting the protestors, and resolved that the nation's capital would not become
"another Seattle." 40
Two of these "troublesome" demonstrations took place in 2000 and 2002. In April,
2000 approximately 10,000 demonstrators came to Washington D.C. for a weekend of
protests in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

31. Id. at 53.
32. See BARBER, supra note 14, at 224.
33. Id. at 226.
34. Id. at 224-25.
35. See Ralph Temple, The Policing of Demonstrationsin the Nation's Capital: Legislative and Judicial
Correctionsof a Police Department'sMisconception of Mission and Failureof Leadership, 8 U.D.C. L. REV.
3, 5 (2005):
But virtually all other problematic demonstrations-those in which the sponsors pre-announce
civil disobedience, such as traffic blocking, or in which some factions are bent on vandalism or
disorder-have been another matter. It is those demonstrations that challenge D.C. Police
Management to honor and protect First Amendment rights of speech and assembly while
maintaining order. And that is where the leadership of the Metropolitan Police Department has,
with rare exception, failed.
Id.
36. See id. at 12 (stating that demonstration sponsors announced they would "shut down the city").
37. See generally id.
38. See Jack Kelley, In D.C., Police, ProtestersAlike Say They're Prepared:Capital Bracesfor Weekend
Demonstrations,USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2000, at 4A (explaining that one website, http://www.al6.org, which
served as a virtual headquarters for protest groups, had a number of postings that threatened violence and
destruction of property).
39. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 52.
40. Kelley, supra note 38 (quoting Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey as saying, "They ain't burning our
city like they did Seattle"); see also John Kifner, Police Move Against Trade Demonstrators, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2000, at A6.
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meetings. 4 1 This demonstration was the first Washington anti-globalization protest
since Seattle. The MPD planned for the event months in advance, secured significant
funding from the federal government, arranged for police assistance from other police
departments, asked the courts to be prepared for mass arrests, investigated and
and mobilized the entire department. 42 Eventually
infiltrated the protesting groups,
43
arrested.
1,300 people were
Not content to deal with unlawful behavior if it occurred, the MPD took various
actions to disrupt and preempt the demonstrations. For example, on Saturday, April 15,
2000, the day before the largest scheduled demonstration, the MPD and City fire
officials entered the anti-globalization groups' headquarters, or "convergence center,"
on the pretext of a fire inspection. 44 Fire officials issued multiple fire code violation
notices and closed down the center, thus seriously disrupting the plans of the
demonstrators and displacing many out-of-town protestors who were staying at the
building. 45 Officials confiscated property of the demonstrators and sealed the building,
46
only letting individuals return two days later-after the demonstrations had ended.
The police chief and his top assistant chief made false public statements that the
confiscated materials included ingredients to make pepper spray and Molotov
47
cocktails.
MPD also used "trap and detain" tactics to round up demonstrators and to
preemptively arrest them. As the New York Times reported in one account:
By late evening . . . about 600 people had been arrested. They faced charges of
parading without a permit and possibly obstructing traffic, although the march, under
continuous police escort, caused little serious disruption on the city's streets as the
marchers mainly stayed on sidewalks. The group of demonstrators had been
marching through downtown streets-progressively blocked off by the police during
the day-when they found themselves blocked, then surrounded by city police
officers on a block of 20th Street .... Although the marchers and their supporters on
nearby sidewalks chanted for the police tolet them go, Police Chief [Charles H.]
to disperse. Reporters
Ramsey said later that the crowd had refused police orders
48
who had observed the march had not heard any such order.
There were also incidents of police using violence against non-violent
demonstrators, including baton strikes and pepper spray. 49 Police arrested and held

41. Anne E. Komblut, Thousands in Protests Against Finance Groups IMF; World Bank Press on in
D.C., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2000, at AI.
42. See Kelley, supra note 38; see also David Montgomery, Protests End with Voluntary Arrests; Police,
DemonstratorsSay They Met Goals, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2000, at Al.

43. See Montgomery, supra note 42, at Al.
44. D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 25-33.
45. Id. at 25.
46. See id. at 35-36.
47. Id. at 32.
48. Kifner, supra note 40.
49. See John Kifier & David E. Sanger, Financial Leaders Meet as Protests Clog Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at Al.
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50
persons for prolonged periods without access to food, water, or counsel.
Similar harsh, arbitrary, and preemptive actions marked the fall 2002 antiglobalization demonstrations. That protest drew approximately 2,000 people, a number
easily overwhelmed by a far larger police force. 5 1 The MPD's internal assessment
predicted no more than 4,000 demonstrators even though, publicly, Police Chief Charles
H. Ramsey told city leaders that 20,000-30,000 would descend on the city. 52 Chief
Ramsey urged workers to take public transportation and expect delays. 53 Citing
54
protestor rhetoric, the Chief said the demonstrators planned to "shut down the city."
The most egregious police action occurred on Friday morning, September 27, 2002.
In what appeared to be a series of preemptive maneuvers netting a total of 600 arrestees,
police funneled hundreds of protestors and many uninvolved bystanders into Pershing
Park on Pennsylvania Avenue. 55 Once they were corralled, police closed up the park
and arrested nearly 400 people. Police then escorted the arrestees to buses, which had
been standing by for that purpose. 56 There had been no violence and virtually no
disorder-just some chanting, drum banging, and milling about. 57 As the police later
conceded,58there was no order to disperse and, more importantly, no basis for an order to
disperse.
City lawyers did not prosecute any of the persons arrested in Pershing Park. But
the aim may never have been prosecution since protestors were held in harsh
circumstances for prolonged periods, exceeding twenty-four hours and, by then, the
protest was over. As Chief Ramsey told the Washington Post at the time, "These
people that are apprehended are going to miss several protests because they'll be behind
, 59
bars."

III.

WHY A LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION WAS NECESSARY

Of the multiple ways to oversee police conduct-internal review, civilian
oversight, and law suits-none was realistically available or likely to result in a timely,
forward-looking response to the police abuse of the anti-globalization demonstrators. A
timely, forward-looking response was insistently needed because similar protests
continued to occur in the District and around the country and because police
departments were copying the "successful" tactics they saw used elsewhere.

50. See Kevin Johnson, Groups Challenge Conduct of Police, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, at 3A.
51. Manny Fernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Police Arrest Hundreds in Protests; Anti-Capitalism
Events Cause Few Disruptions,WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at Al.
52. See D.C. REPORT, supranote 11, at 48.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 48.
55. See id. at48, 51.
56. See id. at 48, 52-54.
57. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 56-57. Prior to coming to the park, some demonstrators broke a
window and overturned newspaper boxes. There was no basis to think that those people were in the group
arrested, and police made no effort to identify them apart from the hundreds of persons who were marching
peacefully. Id.
58. See id. at 53-56.
59. Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, Police, Protestorsin D.C. Preparefor Day of Disruption,WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at BI.
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The MPD, like almost every other police department in the nation, has a system of
Following the 2000 and 2002 demonstrations, MPD did not initiate
internal review.
any review of its actions; this, despite the fact that several officers filed after-action
reports questioning the legality of the Department's behavior and members of the
community publicly complained about the treatment they received. 61 Indeed the
62
Department's own general orders required an investigation under such circumstances.
The Department only acted after the City Council pressured the Mayor to look into the
mass arrests effected at Pershing Park in September 2002. 63 But the reluctantlyconducted internal investigation was plagued by irregularities, including changes at the
direction of the Police Chief which softened criticism of the MPD. 64 In the end, the
investigation was a whitewash. The Chief reported to the Mayor that no police official
should be disciplined for the unlawful arrests at Pershing Park, saying that the officers
acted in "good faith" and were responding to "rapidly evolving circumstances." 65 The
Mayor overruled this recommendation, and a letter of reprimand was sent to the
Assistant Chief who said he gave the order to arrest. 66 Apart from this minor
consequence, no MPD officer or official was formally disciplined in any way for any
action that occurred at either the 2000 or the 2002 demonstrations.
Commentators have routinely questioned the ability of police departments to
reliably or thoroughly investigate themselves. 67 This concern was evident in the case of
the MPD's internal investigation of the Pershing Park arrests. The later legislative
investigation found that, "[tihe [MPD] investigation and release of the final report were
marked by evasions and misstatements by senior officials including Chief Ramsey,
giving rise to the appearance
of an attempt to cover up Chief Ramsey's role in ordering
68
the Pershing Park arrests."
As for other checks on the police, there were no criminal prosecutions of police for
their actions during the 2000 or 2002 demonstrations. 69 There was no investigation by

60. See generally Metropolitan Police Department, Office of Professional Responsibility, http://mpdc.dc.
gov/mpdc/cqp/view,a,1230,Q,540837.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (discussing the MPD's Office of
Professional Responsibility, which oversees the internal review process).
61. D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 44-47.
62. Id. at 76.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 76-80.
65. Memorandum from Chief Charles H. Ramsey to Mayor Anthony A. Williams regarding Final
Decisions on Recommendations Following Review of Actions Taken by Members of the Metropolitan Police
Department During the Fall 2002 IMF/World Bank Protests 2 (Mar. 13, 2003) (available at
http://www.dcd.uscourts. gov/02-2010.pdf as part of the public docket for Chang v. United States, No. 022010, made available on September 12, 2003, by order of Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan). See also Carol D.
Leonnig, IMF Arrests Improper, Police Found; Ramsey Memo Acknowledges Protesters Weren't Warned,
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at B2.
66. Leonnig, supra note 65 ("Two sources close to the investigation said that the mayor overruled the
chiefs March recommendation and that [Police Commander] Newsham was given a minor reprimand.
Ramsey and Newsham would not comment yesterday.").
67. See Barbara Armacost, OrganizationalCulture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453,
537 (2004) ("The universal practice of police organizations of limiting information regarding complaints filed
and aspects of the investigation exacerbates this problem. It creates an appearance of favoritism and
undermines citizen perceptions of legitimacy.").
68. D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 73.
69. This is not atypical. In fact, in many cases it seems that failing to file charges is the rule rather than
the exception. See Craig Whitlock & David S. Fallis, Police Rarely Charged in Federal Probes, WASH.
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the City's Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB).
There were, however, a
number of civil lawsuits seeking damages and injunctive relief. 71 Three of the lawsuits
remain pending. 72 It is highly unlikely, though, that any of these cases will effect
fundamental reform in how the MPD behaves. These cases are hard to bring, and
damage awards are not often an incentive to adopt reforms. 73 Injunctive relief offers
greater potential for change since department-wide policies and practices can be altered
and the results supervised by a judge with continuing authority. 74 Yet whether these
lawsuits will successfully achieve injunctive relief is unclear, and it might be years
before the open cases are finally resolved. The simple fact was that the D.C. Council
was the only body willing and able to act in a timely and effective manner.
IV.

BENEFITS OF A LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION

Perhaps the greatest advantage of oversight via a legislative investigation is the
ability to address police practices at a broader, systemic level. Internal reviews or
citizen review boards focus on individual complaints which in turn "tends to make rank
and file officers scapegoats for police misconduct." 75 Civil lawsuits for damages 76 and
criminal prosecutions also take a narrow look backward with the objective of fixing
blame. And, while civil injunctive relief can offer forward-looking reform, it, like all
litigation, is bound by the issues raised by the parties and the confining forms of proof
associated with lawsuits. Legislative bodies can inform themselves broadly, rely on
experts at will, follow trails wherever they may lead, and disregard strict courtroom

POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at BI (showing that between 1991 and 1998, only 1.5% of civil rights complaints led to
filed charges); Kevin Flynn, Public ComplaintsAre Played Down, Police Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,

1999, at Al ("Of the 420 cases his office has examined so far, Mr. Green said, the [New York Police]
department failed to file charges in 295 of the cases. In 90 percent of those cases, he said, police officials
within the Department Advocate's office rejected the review board's finding without conducting any
investigation of their own.").
70. The CCRB (now called the Police Complaints Board) can dismiss, conciliate, mediate or adjudicate
complaints of harassment, use of unnecessary or excessive force, use of language or conduct that is insulting,
demeaning or humiliating, discriminatory treatment, and retaliation. D.C. CODE § 5-1107(a) (2005).
Apparently no complaints were lodged with the CCRB. Perhaps one reason is that some officers removed
their badges during the demonstrations and individual officers could not be identified. More fundamentally,
however, the actions of the police during the demonstrations were primarily actions of the police as units,
actions directed from the top and in accord with policy and planning developed from the top.
71. Alan Beattie, Legal Battle Looms Over Protests in Washington, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at 6;
Manny Fernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, GWU Students Sue Police Over Mass Arrests; Lawsuit Alleges
Protest Observers, News PhotographersWere Unfairly Detained, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at B3; Carol D.
Leonnig, District Reaches Settlement Over Mass Arrests; Other Lawsuits Pending From Protests, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at B1.
72. Carol D. Leonnig & Del Quentin Wilber, D.C. Settles With Mass Arrest Victims; 7 Rounded Up in
2002 IMF Protest to Get $425,000 and an Apology, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at Al.
73. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra
note 1, at 247.
74. See Laurie Levinson, Police Corruptionand New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 2530 (2001) (identifying the strengths and weaknesses of pattern and practice law suits and court-supervised
consent decrees, but cautioning that, "[i]t is an open question whether these consent decrees have been
effective in bringing police reform").
75. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigmof Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department "Pattern
or Practice"Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 3, 24 (2003).
76. Pattern and practice lawsuits are different in that they do look at police reform more broadly and
importantly bring in monitoring from the outside.
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rules of evidence. 77 It is particularly appropriate to evaluate the MPD handling of mass
demonstrations from this broader perspective since, in policing demonstrations,
individual officers are not acting as agents of discretion on the street. Rather they are
quasi-military units responding to a pre-existing plan created at the top and
administered from the top. Unlike the problem of police use of excessive force, police
action during demonstrations cannot plausibly be excused as the behavior of a few "bad
' 78
apples."
Another advantage of the legislative investigation is greater police cooperation.
Since the focus of a legislative investigation is not to affix blame per se, there is a
greater likelihood that officers will use back channels to inform the committee of what
they know or to testify about behavior they found questionable. Of course, the
operative words here are "more likely." Even in a legislative investigation, individual
officers may dissemble or cover for higher-ups. The MPD investigation encountered
witnesses who either exhibited stunning failures to recall or made implausible claims of
non-involvement.
The format of a legislative investigation also enhances the prospect of cooperation.
Testimony can be taken in non-public, executive session. 79 The witness can provide
narrative answers, opinions, and hearsay, and is not subject to cross examination. In
short, a witness can tell his or her story freely and fully. A more general form of
cooperation may also arise as the entire process of an investigation including a final
report, recommendations, and proposed legislation generates a salutary dialectic among
the legislature, the executive, and the police department. This, of itself,
can lead to the
80
department recognizing the need for and voluntarily adopting reforms.
A legislative investigation can also move forward with relative speed. Unlike
litigation which can drag on for years, an investigation can be completed in months, and
legislation can follow soon after. The Judiciary Committee of the D.C. Council began
its legislative investigation partly out of frustration with the agonizingly slow pace of
the litigation spawned by MPD's handling of the 2000-2003 demonstrations. For
example, cases arising out of the fall 2000 demonstration are still only in a pre-trial
stage, and no trial date has yet been set, five years after the event. In contrast, the
Committee authorized an investigation by a resolution adopted on April 28, 2003. Over

77. See Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 341 (2002) (suggesting the benefits of legislative
investigation are the legislature's ability to look at a matter comprehensively, to call upon experts, to translate
efforts into reforms, and to respond to local realities).
78. See Armacost, supra note 67, at 457-59 (discussing this persistent police explanation for bad
behavior).
79. D.C. COUNCIL R. 306. This procedure, although used only once previously in the District of
Columbia, proved useful during the testimony of several witnesses.
80. Indeed, as a result of the D.C. legislative investigation, the police modified their Standard Operating
Procedures in 2004 to limit the scope of allowable police intelligence gathering activities directed at protest
groups. See Letter from Mayor Anthony Williams to Councilwoman Kathleen Patterson (with enclosure,
"Responses to Recommendations in the Judiciary Committee Report on Investigation of the Metropolitan
Police Department's Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District of Columbia") (Apr. 20,
2004) [hereinafter Mayor's Letter](on file with author) (stating in the enclosure that "[o]n February 15, 2004,
MPD implemented a standard operating procedure for the conduct of intelligence gathering activities.
Included in the directive are restrictions governing when and under what circumstances intelligence activities
should be initiated").
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the next eight months the Committee collected and studied case law, documents, videos,
police manuals, and responses to subpoenas and written interrogatories, and conducted
depositions. This effort culminated in public hearings held on December 17 and 18,
2003, and the Committee issued a final report on March 24, 2004. By the end of 2004,
the Committee drafted and reported out a comprehensive bill: First Amendment Rights
and Police Standards Act of 2004.81 This model legislation declares protection of First
Amendment rights to be the public policy of the District of Columbia, sets "rules of
engagement" to be followed by the police in dispersing, arresting, or holding
demonstrators, specifies the circumstances permitting investigation of protest groups,
and provides for officer training and supervision. FARPSA became law in 2005.82
Legislative investigations, if legitimately and seriously pursued, also have some
potential to counter the "dual messages" phenomenon that allows police to
acknowledge the rules that limit their behavior but to flout them at the same time.
Formal policies and official pronouncements of police departments never prescribe or
approve of violation of rights of free expression any more than they prescribe or
authorize brutality, corruption, or unlawful conduct. But informal messages and signals
may communicate a different set of norms. When police are told exaggerated tales of
having to defend their community against violent, Molotov-cocktail-throwing hordes,
when they are complimented for their behavior following demonstrations involving
police abuse or illegal arrests, when personnel actions (citations, promotions, and the
like) 83 reward aggressive or preemptive conduct, and when the media applaud the
police for their fine work in quelling or neutralizing peaceful demonstrators, the police
notice the disconnect and tend to conform
their conduct to the informal understandings,
84
rules.
"real"
the
as
view
they
or what
During the April 2000 and fall 2002 Washington, D.C. demonstrations, top police
officials, including the Chief of Police, conveyed the message to the rank and file that it
was an us-against-them situation. 85 Top officials grossly inflated the number of
protestors planning to come to the capital and implicitly or explicitly approved or
condoned aggressive police behavior, mass arrests, use of batons, pepper spray, preemptive trap and arrest maneuvers, mass arrests, and harsh and prolonged post-arrest
detentions. 86 When the Mayor publicly expressed confidence in the Chief's ability to
81. FARPSA, 52 D.C. Reg. 2296 (Mar. 11,2005).
82. The legislative history of Bill 15-968 is available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us
(FARPSA (Bill No. 15-968) was enacted on January 27, 2005. It was assigned Act No. 15-757. D.C. Law
15-352 became effective on April 13, 2005).
83. On the very same day that the AFL-CIO was calling for the resignation of Miami police chief John
Timoney for the violent attack on demonstrators in 2003, Union Wants Probe into Miami FTAA Protests, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at 3A, the Chamber of Commerce was giving him an award for his
handling of the demonstration. Jane Bussey, Miami-Area Chamber Lauds Police Chiefs Work During
Americas Trade Meeting, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 2003. And, not only have the D.C. officers involved in the
unlawful arrests in the Pershing Park incident suffered no ill consequences, they have been promoted. Del
Quentin Wilber, Senior Police Posts Shuffled After 4 Leave; 2 Assistant Chiefs Among Retiring Commanders,
WASH. POST, July 29, 2004, at T3.
84. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 67, at 515-21 (discussing the phenomenon of the "double message"
primarily in the context of police brutality); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 163 (1990)
("Police agencies have long been notorious for urging rank-and-file officers to do one thing while rewarding
them for doing something else.").
85. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 38; Kifner, supra note 40.
86. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 11; see also Kelley, supra note 38.
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investigate the complaints arising out of the 2000 demonstration, the Chief responded:
"Unless there is overwhelming evidence that an officer physically abused someone, I
intend to give them all medals, not discipline, because they did a good job." 87 And,
when speaking of the unlawful mass arrests during the fall 2002 demonstration, the
Chief expressed satisfaction with that action, consistently defended all of the tactics
his own role in the events until the legislative
used, and refused to acknowledge
88
investigation pinned him down.
The Mayor and media lauded the actions of the police. The leading paper in the
city, the Washington Post, praised the Department after the 2000 demonstrations with
an editorial entitled, "Hail To The Chief-And His Cops."' 89 A Washington Post news
article, entitled, "Taken For a Ride, Police Turn Bike Strike Into A Tour De Force,"
described the MPD's 2002 unlawful funneling, trapping, and arresting of seventy-five
demonstrating bike riders as an amusing trick played on the protestors. 90 The article
stated in part:
[Y]ou could tell that the D.C. police bikers thought this whole scene was a hoot.
They straddled their two-wheelers across the street, watching, smiling sometimes.
They could afford to be patient. The route may have been 'secret,' [referring to the
protestors' attempt to keep their destination quiet] but the police had a pretty good
idea of how this adventure
was going to end anyway. Everyone else was in for a
91
arrest].
[i.e.,
surprise
But, a legislative investigation can express a counter message and show that there are
consequences if departmental rules and constitutional rights are violated.
Finally a legislative investigation offers advantages even over its close cousin, the
"blue ribbon" or special commission. 92 A blue ribbon commission is ordinarily created
by the executive branch, and is composed of a panel of experts, who investigate
perceived problems and report recommendations. 93 Over the past thirty to forty years,
there has been a proliferation of commissions created to study and document police
misconduct. The commissions have produced comprehensive reports chronicling
beatings, violations of civil rights, patterns of bribe taking, and other wrongful conduct
in the nation's police forces, and they have offered wide-ranging and thoughtful

87. Kathryn Sinzinger, Patterson,Graham Seek MPD Inquiry, COMMON DENOMINATOR, Apr. 24, 2000,
at 1.
88. D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 73.
89. Editorial, Hail to the Chief-And His Cops, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2000, at A26 ("[The protest
organizers] gave themselves an 'A-plus' for PR when in fact they created a weak impression and mainly
managed to step on their own fuzzy message by their dubious choice of tactics. If any groups deserve high
marks, they are the disciplined men and women of the Metropolitan Police Department and other law
enforcement agencies who served under D.C. Chief Charles Ramsey.").
90. David Montgomery, Taken for A Ride; Police Turn the Bike Strike Into a Tour de Force, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at Cl.
91. Id.
92. The use of a commission can be an especially important alternative to an investigative process in
certain cases, because commissions are non-political bodies. Whereas legislatures are subject to constant
political scrutiny, commissions are removed from such pressures. Thus, in circumstances where political
pressures could derail an investigation, commissions can still provide valuable oversight.
93. Walker, supra note 75, at 20.
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recommendations for reform. Some of the more prominent commissions include the
94
1967 President's Crime Commission, which was designed to combat organized crime,
the 1992 Christopher Commission, which investigated the use of excessive force by the
95
Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the Rodney King beating,
and the
96
York.
New
in
corruption
police
1994 Mollen Commission, which studied
Like legislative investigations, commission inquiries have the ability to assess
police behavior at a broader level. They have the capacity, even without subpoena
power, to act in a timely fashion. They can identify systemic issues, provide a
comprehensive diagnosis of the problem, and offer blueprints for reform. 97 But
commissions lack the teeth to effectuate reforms. 98
While commission
recommendations have sometimes been implemented, and while commission reports
"have been helpful in understanding the causes of police abuses, they have been
disappointing in leading to changes in actual department practices." 99 With a
legislative investigation, the lawmakers themselves are calling for reform, they are
directly invested in the effort, and they possess the levers to implement change. Even in
such circumstances, of course,
there is no assurance that true reform will result or take
100
hold, but the odds are better.

V.

THE KEYS TO A SUCCESSFUL LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION

There must be political will to launch an investigation into police practices, and
there must be a problem of sufficient gravity to warrant the expenditure of time and
resources. But if an investigation is to begin, a great deal of planning and preparation
must precede it. The immediate challenge in the MPD investigation was to confine the
scope of the inquiry to a manageable size. The relevant period covered three years of
activity and multiple incidents. The solution was to focus on several particular events
and use them as case studies. Unless trimmed in this way, the investigation could have
easily become a meandering slog through mounds of information, thus losing
momentum and the hope of a timely report.
Next began the arduous task of deciding what documentary information to seek, in

94. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
95. INDEP. COMM'N ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991).
96. THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS

(1994).
97. Findley, supra note 77, at 333.
98. Samuel Walker, Setting the Standards: The Efforts and Impact of Blue-Ribbon Commissions on the
Police, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 363 (William A. Geller ed., 1985).

99. Levinson, supranote 74, at 24.
100. Of course legislative investigations are not a panacea. Commentators, speaking principally about
Congressional investigations, have cited various limitations. Partisanship and policy differences can destroy
the effectiveness of the investigating body, investigating committees may be corrupted by the same influences
that control the agency under investigation, committees may not be fully motivated unless they can uncover a
politically favorable scandal, or committees may be overzealous and improperly hold witnesses up to ridicule
or condemnation (e.g., the McCarthy hearings). See, e.g., Morris S. Ogul, Congressional Oversight:
Structures and Incentives, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 317 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer
eds., 2d ed. 1981); BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 21 (1989).
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what order, and from whom. This required an understanding of how the MPD operated,
what sorts of documents would be generated in connection with policing a
demonstration, and who the actors were. The Committee could not have prepared as
effectively as it did without having persons inside and outside of the MPD who were
thoroughly familiar with its operations and willing to educate the Committee. This is a
critical component of a successful investigation that seeks to uncover not just what
happened at certain events but the actual practices and behavior within the police
department.
There were many sessions devoted to preparing subpoenas and others devoted to
enforcing them. At many points along the way, the chair of the Judiciary Committee,
Councilwoman Kathy Patterson, had to negotiate, insist, threaten court action, and
cajole executive branch officials to respond fully and promptly. A successful
investigation needs a political leader willing to fight for information and to be
persistent. If not, the effort will flounder on delay and noncompliance. As the
Committee found, even if you have full commitment, you still may not get everything
you need or request. Subpoena power is a mighty force. A credible threat to use court
enforcement or public disclosure can move even recalcitrant police departments to
cooperate.
Once documentary subpoenas and written depositions were served and
substantially complied with, the Committee turned its attention to the handling of
witnesses. It settled on a rarely used procedure, namely questioning witnesses in
executive session.101 These were under-oath, non-public sessions that gave the
Committee and the witness a private setting, free of distraction and free of any
distorting influence of media attention. The non-public questioning also served to
protect the identity of undercover officers, provide some shield for officers who were
concerned about departmental retribution for their testimony, and limit the ability of
officers to collaborate on or conform their testimony.
The rules governing these executive sessions were the same as those applicable in a
public hearing and gave the Committee considerable latitude to develop the facts and
secure a witness's cooperation. After being sworn in, witnesses were advised of their
rights to claim the Fifth Amendment (none did), to invoke any common law privileges,
such as spousal privilege (none did), to be assisted by counsel (almost all were), and to
make an opening statement (almost none did). Witnesses were also told that they would
be protected against retaliation for their testimony by the District of Columbia's
Whistleblower's Protection Act. 102
Operating almost like a grand jury or an investigating magistrate, the executive
session questioning was done by Committee counsel. The witness was told that the
proceeding was not like a trial, that it was not an adversary proceeding, that hearsay was
acceptable, and that full and complete answers could include the witness's opinion. The
witness and the witness's lawyer were advised that only objections based on privilege
were permissible, all rulings would be made by the Committee counsel, and the
witness's lawyer had no right to pose questions or cross examine.

101. See D.C. Council R. 306.
102. D.C. CODE §§ 1-615.51-1-615.59 (2001).
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The proceeding often had the feel of a deposition as witnesses were led through a
series of questions, but it was also like a conversation. The questioning took place in a
small conference room, with few persons present, usually three persons from the
Committee, the witness, and the witness's lawyer. It was audio taped. On occasion a
witness's lawyer would complain that a question was unclear or interject in some other
way to interrupt or stop the witness from answering. However, like any other
legislative hearing, the lawyer's role was confined to advising the witness if assistance
was sought or to protecting any privileges the witness may have had. For the most part,
the Committee was successful in preventing lawyer interference, and that, combined
with the non-adversary and non-threatening environment, often produced valuable
information.
The Committee followed a fairly conventional approach to the calling of witnesses,
namely working from the bottom up. Out of respect, the Committee did not call the
Chief of Police to testify in executive session. His testimony came in the form of
responses to interrogatories, and he also gave live testimony at a two-day public
hearing. By then the Committee pretty much had all of the relevant facts in hand.
The public hearings also served a separate, valuable function. They highlighted the
issues and drew media attention. They allowed members of the public, interested
groups, and aggrieved citizens to participate directly. They were also a further means of
countering the "dual message" phenomenon as everyone could see police officials
facing criticism, not approval, for violating their formal rules and standards.
VI. RESULTS
The Committee issued its investigative report on March 24, 2004. Overall, the
Committee found that in policing the anti-globalization demonstrations, the MPD had
failed "to acknowledge and protect the rights of individuals to privacy, and to free
speech and assembly,"' 103 and repeatedly violated the Department's own guidelines for
handling demonstrations, "including guidelines on use of force in defensive situations,
de-escalation in crowd control, and predicates required for mass arrests." 10 4 The 156page submission provided background, specific findings, and recommendations. The
Report detailed not only MPD conduct during the demonstrations, but also revealed
MPD's "use of undercover officers to infiltrate political organizations in the absence of
criminal activity and in the absence of policy guidance meant to protect the
constitutional rights of those individuals being monitored." 105 The Report also exposed
disturbing practices within the Department that are not necessarily ferreted out in
lawsuits, such as evasion on the part of leaders of the MPD as to their actions and the
failure of the MPD to police its own members for misconduct associated with
demonstrations. 106
Importantly, the Report placed the MPD's behavior within the history of protest in
the District of Columbia, and set it within the larger context of how police departments

103.
104.
105.
106.

D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at i.
Id. at ii.
See generally id. at 75, 80-87.
Id. at 88-99.
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around the country are currently reacting to protests and demonstrations. 10 7 The Report
observed, for example, that:
Through legislation and litigation U.S. police entities, including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, are blurring the distinction between intelligence and law
enforcement as an outgrowth of the war on terrorism. This important and wideranging development includes questioning the continuing validity of the requirement,
heretofore, that criminal activity or the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must
precede police use of certain types of investigation. Earlier prohibitions on creation
of dossiers on individuals based on their political activities have been weakened in
the name of an expanding definition of "law enforcement." Some police departments
apparently are following the lead of the FBI in using "disruption" techniques,
borrowed from intelligence practices overseas and applied locally to prevent or
minimize protest activity. Some local jurisdictions, as well as the Secret Service,
have used buffer or "no protest" zones at public events as a security tool, a practice
that has been challenged for having a chilling effect on civil liberties. 108

The Committee reported on protests in San Francisco, Seattle, and Miami, and
protests at the 2000 Democratic and Republican conventions, 109 and the phenomenon
was repeated again in 2004.110 By linking these events, the Report provided the
opportunity to consider how the practices of one police department are often mimicked
by others and to consider the cumulative impact of such actions.
The media reported on the Committee's work at the various stages of investigation,
public hearings, and findings and recommendations. As a result, there appeared to be a
different perception of the MPD's actions, as was illustrated by an editorial in the
Washington Post on December 17, 2003, which stated:
The committee's probe, which concentrates on the department's handling of
demonstrations in the nation's capital, should be followed closely by residents and
visitors alike .... During the two-day hearing, District residents are likely to gain a
sense of how far their department has fallen from the period in the 1970s and 80s
when the District's police were nationally renowned for their ability to handle large
demonstrations while remaining on the proper side of the Constitution.
112

Gone was "Hail to the Chief and his Cops."
The Committee furnished a copy of its Report to the Mayor, who had agreed to
have the Deputy Mayor, the Police Chief, and the city's lawyers prepare a response to
each recommendation it contained. That Response agreed in whole or part with many

107. Id. at 7-16.
108. Id. at 7.
109. D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 9-12.
110. See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 28 (discussing anti-Bush rally in New York); Moore, supra note 28;
Cardwell, supra note 28.
111. Editorial, Spotlight on the Cops, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A42.
112. See Editorial, Hail to the Chief-And His Cops, supra note 86.
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of the recommendations but disagreed with many others. 113 For example, in answer to
the Committee's concerns that no guidelines existed to regulate undercover
investigations of protest groups, the Response identified a new standard operating
procedure (SOP) the MPD had just adopted to remedy the problem.ll 4 On the other
hand, the Response disagreed with the recommendation that "MPD should be prohibited
from using undercover officers to conduct surveillance of individuals or organizations
based solely on the content of their political speech or ideology."''115 Overall, the
Response showed that fundamental differences remained, but it was clear that the
Committee's work had already provoked reform, and to that extent, had already served
its dialectical function.
The ultimate result of the investigation was a model statute which declares that
protestors are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment and, specifically, that
demonstrators have the right to be near the object of their protest so that they may be
116
seen and heard. The new law establishes rules governing how the police train for,
investigate, "17 and manage protests and demonstrations, 118 as well as how they handle
unpermitted demonstrations, 119 crowd dispersal, 12 and protestor arrests and
detentions. 12 1 For example, because the police practice of dispersing and arresting
protestors for lack of a permit or the rowdy behavior of a few individuals repeatedly
created the predicate for arbitrary action or preemptive arrests, the new law prohibits
arresting protestors solely because they lack a permit to demonstrate. 122 Moreover, if
there are reasons to arrest persons within a demonstration, the law provides that those
persons and not the entire gathering are subject to arrest. And, should grounds exist for
dispersing an entire crowd-grounds limited to a significant number of participants
violating time, place, and manner restrictions where reasonable measures to insure
compliance have been tried and are unavailing; a significant number of participants
engaging in unlawful disorderly conduct or violence; or a public safety emergencyproper and adequate notice must be given. The essence of these provisions is to limit
police to proportionate, graduated, and precise actions.
The First Amendment and Police Standards Act also establishes the practices to be
followed in making arrests and holding persons arrested in connection with a protest or

113. See Mayor's Letter, supra note 80.
114. Id. at Enclosure 3 ("On February 15, 2004, MPD implemented a standard operating procedure for the
conduct of intelligence gathering activities. Included in the directive are restrictions governing when and
under what circumstances intelligence activities should be initiated.").
115. Id. (arguing "[t]here may be circumstances in which the particular group undergoing investigation
may espouse violence as an explicit part of its ideology. It would be inappropriate to prohibit surveillance
activity solely because it is an element of the group's ideology").
116. FARPSA § 115 ("The Chief of Police shall ensure that all relevant MPD personnel, including
command staff, supervisory personnel, and line officers, are provided regular and periodic training on the
handling of, and response to, First Amendment assemblies.").

117. Id. § 207.
118. Id. § 107.
119. Id. § 107(f)(l) ("Where ... a [First Amendment] assembly plan has not been approved, the MPD
shall, consistent with the interests of public safety, seek to respond to and handle the assembly in substantially
the same manner as it responds to and handles assemblies with approved plans.").
120. FARPSA § 107(e).
121. Id. §§ 111-112.
122. Id. § 105(a).
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demonstration. 123 The investigation found that it was an MPD practice and a practice
of other departments around the country to hold arrestees for long periods under
uncomfortable or painful circumstances. 124 It appeared that such tactics were designed
to keep protestors from rejoining the protests and to punish them for their activities.
Neither purpose is permissible, but it is fairly easy to disguise these objectives by citing
administrative problems, such as, "The computers crashed," or "We just didn't have
enough personnel at the intake site." The legislation sets out specific protocols to
counter these tendencies.
Of course, legislative solutions have limits. First, one might question why
legislation is necessary at all given that rights of free expression are already protected
by the Constitution. It is true that the Constitution protects freedom of expression and
other rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. But it
is also true that the Constitution does not fully protect us against all substantial
invasions of fundamental liberties. As academics are fond of noting, the Constitution is
a floor, not a ceiling of protection. Justice Clarence Thomas captured this reality when
he joined with a majority of the Supreme Court in holding that it was perfectly
constitutional to forfeit a wife's interest in the family car, even though she was
completely innocent of her husband's illegal use of the car. 125 He said that the outcome
was "ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything
that is intensely undesirable." 126 Legislation can be the antidote by creating rights, or
extending and elaborating on existing constitutional protections. That is why we have
civil rights statutes, privacy acts, and laws limiting otherwise lawful police actions such
as surveillance.
Even where the Constitution does protect individual rights, legislation can give
more detailed content and structure to those rights. This is the case, for instance, with
the Speedy Trial Act,127 which specifies and fleshes out the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment's requirement that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy ...trial," 128 or the federal wiretapping statute, 129 which amplifies
Fourth Amendment rights as they relate to telephone taps. 130 Even statutory provisions
that simply mirror constitutional guarantees have an important role in protecting liberty
and individual dignity. They affirm legislative commitment to fundamental principles
131
and renew public awareness. They have, in other words, an expressive function.
This can be particularly effective in countering the "dual messages" phenomenon that

123. Id. §§ 110-112.
124. See Temple, supra note 35, at 12.
125. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 454 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 454.
127. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
129. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. 1i1, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 &
Supp.2005).
130. Id.
131. There is a significant amount of literature dedicated to the discussion of expressive functions of law.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politicsand the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 765,
767-74 (1998); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 585 (1998); Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2027-28 (1996).
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allows police
to acknowledge the rules that limit their behavior but to ignore them all
132
the same.
Another shortcoming of legislative solutions is that some aspects of policing do not
33
lend themselves to rules. Sometimes the best that can be done is to set standards. 1
The Committee recognized the difficult task of legislating in a way that preserved
needed police discretion but also reined in excess. The new legislation begins with 34a
broad statement of policy acknowledging the fundamental rights of free expression. 1
Then, when dealing with matters which require discretion, such as when to use certain
investigative techniques like infiltration, the legislation uses procedural devices such as
requiring approval from a higher ranking officer, 135 limiting the duration of
approvals, 136 and documenting the uses of the technique. 137 These sorts of procedural
devices are a common means of structuring an officer's thinking, making sure proper
justifications can be expressed, and getting the sober benefits of oversight.
Finally, even where legislative rules make sense, simply adopting more rules will
mean little if the rules are ignored. The Committee found that many of the police
actions during the 2000 and 2002 demonstrations were already prohibited by internal
orders and policies. Embodying rules in legislation may give them more heft, but the
police themselves must commit to following the rules. One glaring disappointment of
the D.C. legislative investigation was the unwillingness of top police department
officials to acknowledge mistakes. That stance could be partly explained by concern
over pending lawsuits. But the instinct never to admit fault appears to be deeply
ingrained. 138 Indeed, when looking at all of the Police Chief's public comments and

132. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
133. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 22 (1992) (assessing the value of standards and rules in different contexts); see also Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995).
134. FARPSA § 103.
It is the declared public policy of the District of Columbia that persons and groups have a right to
organize and participate in peaceful First Amendment assemblies on the streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways, and in the parks of the District of Columbia, and to engage in First Amendment
assembly near the object of their protest so they may be seen and heard, subject to reasonable
restrictions designed to protect public safety, persons, and property, and to accommodate the
interest of persons not participating in the assemblies to use the streets, sidewalks, and other public
ways to travel to their intended destinations, and use the parks for recreational purposes.
Id.
135. Id. §§ 205(b), 206(b), 207(d).
136. Id. §§ 205(d), 206(d).
137. Id.§§ 211,212.
138. This instinct might in fact come with the territory of being a law enforcement officer. As one
commentator has pointed out,
Socialization into law enforcement occurs over many months of training. During this period,
recruits don a transitional uniform and persona. They leam rules, procedures, law, communication
skills, first aid, weaponry, fitness, self-defense, pursuit driving, ethics, and pride. They experience
belonging. They are purposefully convinced they are elite. And somewhere along the way, they
adopt a "warrior-of-the-street" mentality. When the police uniform is finally put on, it is truly a
suit of armor, a persona serving both individual and collective needs. "Image armor" allows the
officer to "always look in control, to always be the authority, to repress emotions, to never admit
mistakes, to 'take charge,' and, consequently, to repress true emotions."
Sally Gross-Farina, Fitfor duty? Cops Choirpractice,and Another Chancefor Healing, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1079, 1106-07(1993).
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testimony, it is evident that he was and remains pleased with his handling of the
demonstrators. 139 But legislation or no legislation, it is probably the case that the
public exposure of the legislative investigation was sufficiently negative that even
troublesome demonstrations will be handled differently in the future. For good
measure, the new law includes a requirement that police officers receive training in how
to handle demonstrations 140 and, specifically, that they actually read and receive
instruction on the provisions of the law and all regulations adopted under it. 141
VII. CONCLUSION

Local legislatures are not known for active oversight of police or security agencies.
The general posture appears to be one of deference to executive or police officials and a
reliance on courts and police boards to correct mistakes. There are probably many
reasons for this hands-off posture. Legislators may feel that they lack the needed
expertise, or they fear their involvement may be viewed as interference with police
discretion and the ability to fight crime, or they may balk at confronting a specialized
bureaucracy that tends to be insular, close-mouthed, and hierarchal. It is especially
remarkable that the District of Columbia City Council pursued its investigation of how
the MPD handled anti-globalization demonstrations, because it is not often that
champions of free speech arise from the legislative ranks. Legislatures tend to cater to
majority wishes. While majorities are committed to free speech and assembly in the
abstract, experience teaches us that when it comes to protests and demonstrations, the
majority seems to want no fuss, and, especially, no traffic tie-ups. If the police have to
use some strong arm measures and indiscriminate arrests to insure convenience, there is
not always a public hue and cry.
But Washington, D.C. is a liberal city with strong civil rights and civil liberties
sensibilities. The police misbehavior was dramatic and embarrassing, and it appeared
that the harsh and unlawful treatment of protestors was planned and unnecessary. It
also appeared that there would be little accountability or correction if the legislature did
not step in. The investigation by the District, and the report and legislation that resulted
from it, illustrated how beneficial such oversight can be. It exposed bad practices and
shortcomings and restored a proper balance between law enforcement and liberty. The
public was informed, persons harmed by the police action had a form of public
recompense, and the police benefited in that they were given clearer rules and a
reasonable structure to guide future decision-making. Overall, the effort was a
remarkable affirmation that good police practices and freedom of expression are not
antithetical.
Given the persistence and seeming intractability of police misconduct, we are
entitled to be skeptical of all models to control it. The simple truth is that no one
approach is sufficient, and all have advantages and disadvantages. Yet, as the District

139. See, e.g., Kifner, supra note 40; D.C. REPORT, supra note 11, at 88-90.
140. FARPSA § 115.

141. Id. Another way to enforce the statute is to provide citizens with a private cause of action. A
provision to this effect was originally included as part of the proposed legislation, and witnesses before the
committee (for example, ACLU representatives) supported this strategy. However, the provision was not
ultimately adopted, primarily due to opposition by the Police Department.
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of Columbia example shows, legislative investigations and oversight can have dramatic
and salutary effects. A legislative approach is well suited to oversee general police
policy or any pre-existing strategy or planning directed by the chief and his top
officials. The public, through its representatives, can and should be actively involved in
setting and overseeing policies concerning such things as anti-terrorism plans, public
surveillance and monitoring, and infiltration of political groups. The District of
Columbia has shown the way.

